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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RODNEY M. LARSEN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
Case No. 
12'13 
EVA FREE KELLY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing 
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third District Court 
In and for Salt Lake County, Utah 
The Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge 
EVA FREE KELLY 
Pro Se 
GERALD E. NIELSON 
840 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff· 
App_ellant 
-
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STRICT PERFORMANCE OF THE TERM~ 
OF THE EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT A~L 
OFFER TO PURCHASE," IS: 
A. IN ERROR; AND 
B. IS NOT CONCLUSIVE OF THE ISSl![ 
OF WHETHER PLAINTIFF PERFORMED 
OR WAS EXCUSED FROM PERFORMING 
BECAUSE IT DOES NOT TAKE INTO A(. 
COUNT PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT THA1 
ABSENT SPECIFIC AGREEMENT ON THE 
PART OF DEFENDANT SHE IS ESTOPPED 
BY HER CONDUCT TO DENY THE COX. 
TINUING VALIDITY OF THE EARNES1 
MONEY AGREEMENT. 
Plaintiff-Appellant's contention that the findJni 
that Plaintiff did not agree to an extension of time,~ 
not supported by the record, is based (I) on the conver· 
sation of the parties at Defendant's home on or about. 
May 25th and ( 2) upon the modification by Plainti!! 
of the original offer of Defendant which included tilt 
April 15th date as follows~ 
"Home to be completed with items as per_al· 
tached sheet. Said work to be completed 10 dil.~i 
after a loan commitment is given by the bank on 
property at 2870-72-7 4 South 3rd East," (em-
phasis added) , 
· t e o! which modification was agreed to by the s1gna ur 
each of the parties. In that connection note that the pro· 
vision was hand-written by Defendant; that by ana 
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from its position on the Earnest Money Agreement it 
was intended to modify the original offer. If it creates 
an ambiguity with the April 15th completion provision, 
all rules of construction of ambiguities favor the "ten 
(10) days after a loan commitment," completion date. 
Plaintiff's principal reliance is upon the conversa-
tion of about May 25th in Defendant's home between 
Plaintiff and Defendant and Defendant's agent, Enoch 
Bautista. Plaintiff testified that he explained to De-
fendant at that meeting that American Savings would 
approve the loan subject to a pledged savings account 
and that she (Defendant) indicated she did not need all 
of her money at that time and that the $5,000.00 could 
remain in the pledged savings account. He further testi-
fied that based on that conversation he immediately 
undertook to finish the items Defendant required to be 
done on the Clark Street property per the list she had 
attached to the Earnest Money Agreement (R. Ill, 
line 18 to R. 112 line 18 and R. 131line10-22). 
Defendant testified that they decided in that con-
versation that the offer would be accepted according to 
when the house was completed (R. 95 line 28-30); that 
she would not have turned the offer down because of the 
pledged savings account (R. 99 line 25 and 26); that as 
a result of that conversation, Plaintiff was still working 
on the transaction and that it was her intention that he 
should ( R. 146 line 26-30) . 
Since that conversation occurred at a time well after 
the April 15th date, Plaintiff contends that while he 
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cannot point to testimony wherein Defendant said· , 
many words that she agreed to extend the time for m ~'
com. 
pletion of the agreement, it is clear either that she ilia 
agree to extend the time for completion or that sn 
acquiesced in the extention of it or that she regarded tfi: 
agreement itself as providing for a later time. No otner 
explanation has been offered by Defendant and Plain. 
tiff respectfully submits no other explanation is poi· 
sible. Nor is that testimony in any way denied, contra. 
dieted or controverted by other factual testimony. 
Even if Defendant did not agree to modifythetim1 
within which the contract could be completed, either 01 
the addition to the Earnest Money Agreement or by h;r 
conversation in the latter part of May, she is estoppedfo 
deny its continuing validity. She testified that she knew 
Plaintiff was continuing to work on the transaction ana 
she intended that he would ( R. 146 line 26-30). Plain. 
tiff, in reliance on that understanding, incurred suo· 
stantial expense to complete the Clark Street proper~ 
in accordance with Defendant's specification (R. rn 
line 11-25). 
If the court now allows Defendant to repudiatetlli 
agreement because it was not completed by April 151~ 
it is saying she can knowingly allow Plaintiff to expena 
time and money on the premise that they have an agrei· 
ment and thereafter at her pleasure deny that agrei· 
ment. Plaintiff contends it is a classic situation for t~I 
application of the rules relating to estoppel and wah''.r 
cited by Plaintiff at page 8 of his original Appe!lanl! 
brief. 
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Note that the Supreme Court's decision recites that 
Defendant by her counsel notified Plaintiff that the 
contract was terminated at a meeting on or about May 
Z5th. The meeting on or about that date was one between 
Plaintiff, Defendant and one Enoch Bautista in De-
fendant's home. The meeting referred to by the court 
occurred ten ( 10) days to two ( 2) weeks later in a 
realtor's office. There was no communication between 
the parties between those meetings. Defendant's pre-
cipitous termination was the very next communication 
from Defendant to Plaintiff after the meeting of May 
25th. Plaintiff's improvements of the Clark Street prop-
erty were done as a result of the May 25th meeting and 
before the termination meeting. 
CONCLUSION 
It is with some reluctance and much trepidation 
that Plaintiff asks the court to reconsider this appeal and 
then simply quibbles about was the record shows the 
facts were. 
Plaintiff feels that the Supreme Court has over-
emphasized a finding of fact prepared by Defendant's 
counsel and eventually signed by Judge Sawaya, even 
though it did not represent his recollection of the matter 
at the time of the hearing on Plaintiff's objections to 
those proposed findings and was later adopted by Judge 
Sawaya at Plaintiff's request upon the failure of De-
fendant's counsel to prepare new findings in accordance 
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,. 
with the court's oral instructions given to him at t~ 
hearing (see substance of the court's order R. 80·81). 
That problem may have been compounded~ 
Plaintiff's failure to request oral argument. Plainilll 
failed to request oral argument because Defendant W 
not filed a brief and was not represented by an attornei. 
Plaintiff did not wish to appear to pick on a defenseleii 
woman. It later develops that the record was check~ 
out by Lambert Gibson and Defendant's prose briefwm 
filed on the day before the hearing on appeal. 
Plaintiff respect£ ully asks the court to reconsid~ 
this matter and urges that it find that Defendant is not 
entitled on or about May 25th to knowingly induce 01 
even allow Plaintiff to incur substantial expense on ilii 
strength of an agreement and thereafter terminate thal 
agreement for Plaintiff's failure to complete it priorro 
April 15th of the same year. 
Respect£ ully submitted: 
Gerald E. Nielson 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
840 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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